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This paper argues in favor of using a set of Gricean maxims to account 
for preferred interpretations of English anaphora. The distribution of 
English reflexives has generally been explained in purely structural terms 
in Chomsky's binding theory. Chomsky's basic idea is that reflexives and 
pronouns are in complementary distribution. However, there has been a 
longstanding awareness of the fact that there are a large set of marginal 
occurrences of reflexives which are not directly predicted by the general 
typology of the binding theory. Well-known cases include 'picture-noun 
reflexives: 'long-distance reflexives: and 'reflexives with split antecedents.' 
In this paper, we will show why we need to resort to semantic/pragmatic 
considerations to weigh the acceptability of the problematic cases men-
tioned above. Specifically, we will endeavor to make the following points: 
(i) that syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are interconnected to determine 
the distribution and interpretation of English anaphora; and (ii) that the 
distinctive and mysterious behavior of the problematic English reflexives 
can be accounted for straightforwardly by the systematic interaction of 
neo-Gricean pragmatic principles, such as the Q-, 1-, M-principles. 
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1 Introduction 
Over the last four decades, research into the nature of natural lan-
* This research was supported by a grant from the 2005 Seoul Women's University Bahrom 
Research Fund. A previous draft of this paper was presented at the 38th Seoul Linguistics 
Forum 2004 held at Seoul National University in the winter of 2004. I thank the participants 
of the meeting and three anonymous reviewers of Language Research for their valuable 
comments and suggestions. All the remaining errors are mine. 
910 Kim, Sun-Hee 
guage has frequently focused on the distribution and interpretation of 
anaphora (Safir, 2004, p.1).1) It has commonly been assumed that simple 
generalizations determine the pattern of anaphora and that the relation 
between the possible antecedents and anaphoric forms can be accounted 
for in purely structurai terms. The central line of work in Chomskyan 
generative grammar held to the view that where a reflexive can be 
coindexed with a certain NP, no other pronoun can be coreferential 
with this NP. It is worth noting that the complementarity between re-
flexives and pronouns within Chomsky's generative grammar is cap-
tured by the notion of the governing category which is uniformly de-
fined both for reflexive-binding and the pronominal disjoint reference 
principle (Chomsky, 1981, 1986; Reinhart, 1983; Kim, 2003; Safir, 2004). 
The distributions of anaphors and pronominals are treated by the fol-
lowing binding conditions: 
(l) Principle A: An anaphor (reflexive and reciprocal) is bound (i.e. 
coindexed and c-commanded) in its governing 
category.2) 
(2) Principle B: A pronominal is free in its governing category. 
These simple principles explain why Tom can be the possible ante-
cedent of himself in (3), but not in (4). 
(3) a. Tomi hates [himself/*himi]. 
b. Tomi washed [himself/*himiJ. 
(4) a. Tomi said Mary hates [*himself/himi]. 
b. Tom/s mother hates [*himself/himd. 
However, cross-linguistic comparisons have revealed that anaphoric el-
1) Anaphora refers to the phenomenon whereby one linguistic element that lacks a clear in-
dependent reference (i.e. an anaphoric element) can pick up reference through connection 
with another linguistic element (Le. an antecedent) (Levinson, 1987; see also Lust, 1986 and 
Huang, 2000). According to this definition of anaphora, zeros (i.e. empty categories), reflex-
ives, reciprocals, and pronouns can be employed as an anaphoric element. 
2) a is the governing category for 13 if and only if a is the minimal category containing 13 
and a governor of 13, where a = NP or S (Chomsky, 1981, p.l88). 
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ements in different languages pattern in different ways, undermining 
the empirical generalizations the binding theory was based on (Koster 
and Reuland, 1991). Furthermore, a number of articles and books on ana-
phora have also proved that even in languages like English the dis-
tributions of anaphors and pronominals actually overlap to a large ex-
tent (Kuno, 1987; Zribi-Hertz, 1989; Reinhart and Reuland, 1993; Pollard 
and Sag, 1992; Safir, 2004, among others). Well-known cases include the 
following examples: 
(5) a. Tomi thought that pictures of [himi/himselfi] would be on sale. 
b. Tomi said that there was a picture of [him/himseI6] at the 
studio. 
(6) a. Tomi hid the book behind [himi/himselfi]. 
b. Tomi pulled the blanket over [him/himselfi]. 
(7) a. Shei told him he should marry a woman like [heri/herselfil. 
(Stirling and Huddleston, 2002, p.l494) 
b. Anni suggested that the reporter pay both the victim and 
[her/herselfil for their time. (Stirling and Huddleston, 2002, 
p.l494) 
There have been two opposite responses to this set of problematic 
data. On the one hand, various attempts have been made to rescue the 
principles A and B by amending them so that all marked cases could be 
accounted for within syntactic theory. On the other hand, it has been 
claimed that those same marked occurrences of reflexives are outside 
the scope of syntax and involve principles pertaining to discourse gram-
mar (Zribi-Hertz, 1989, p.69S; see also Kuno, 1987; Pollard and Sag, 1992; 
Yi,2001). 
In this article we offer an account of English anaphora interpretations 
that integrates the diverse perspectives pertaining to this subject. 
Agreeing with Zribi-Hertz (1989) and Pollard and Sag (1992), we argue 
that the problematic occurrences of reflexives mentioned above are ex-
empt from grammatical constraints such as binding principles}) 
3) For this reason, Pollard and Sag (1992) named these refIexives 'exempt anaphors: 
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However, we depart from them in claiming that in order to show the 
complete picture of anaphora distributions (i.e. reflexives, zero anaphora, 
and pronominal anaphora), we should not simply segregate exempt- and 
non-exempt anaphors as irreconcilably distinct categories. Rather, since 
the same lexical form is used in both cases, it would be a lot more pref-
erable if we could give a unified account of the apparent differences of 
these two groups. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the distribution 
of English reflexives that theories of anaphora must deal with. Section 3 
forms the main part of our analysis. We argue that the marked occur-
rences of long distance reflexives in English can be accounted for if we 
refer to a generalized conversational implicature. More specifically, fol-
lowing Levinson (1987), we advocate using a set of revised Gricean max-
ims to account for preferred interpretations of English reflexives, pro-
nouns, and zeros, and in so doing, we raise the possibility that a Gricean 
theory of implicature provides a systematic partial reduction of the 
Binding Conditions Band C.4) We also intend to show that even in lan-
guages like English which has been known as a syntactic language as 
opposed to a pragmatic language like Korean, not only the occurrences 
of marked reflexives but also the distributions of ordinary pronouns can 
be largely accounted for by independently motivated Gricean principles. 
Finally section 4 summarizes the argument. 
2 Properties of Anaphora and Theoretical Issues 
Generally speaking, it has been widely accepted that English reflexives 
manifest the following properties: 
(8) a. A reflexive pronoun must have a coindexed, c-commanding ante-
cedent NP within its minimal domain. 
b. Reflexives are in complementary distribution with pronouns. 
c. Discourse binding of reflexives is not allowed. 
d. Reflexives cannot take split antecedents. 
4) Principle C says that an r-expression is free. Here r-expressions stand for inherently refer-
ential expressions. 
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Within the framework of generative grammar, the properties of reflexives 
in (8) are borne out as follows: (a) is what Principle A requires. Therefore, 
due to this property, long-distance binding of reflexives is not allowed. (b) 
is due to the interaction of Principle A and B. (c) is the direct outcome of 
(a). (d) follows from (a) because split antecedents would not qualify as a 
single binder (Pollard and Sag, 1992, p.263). As we briefly sketched in the 
previous section, however, none of these beliefs can be maintained in the 
face of the facts. Let us consider so-called 'picture noun reflexives' first: 
(9) a. Johni said to Mary that there was a picture of [himselfi/himd 
in the post office. 
b. Johni heard from Bill that pictures of [himself/himil would be 
on sale.5) 
c. The picture of [herselVheril on the front page of the Times 
confirmed the allegations MarYi had been making over the 
years. (Pollard and Sag, 1992, p.264) 
d. Those pictures of [himselVhimd taught JOhni an important 
lesson. (Yi, 2001, p.372) 
Sentences (9a)-(9c) indicate that reflexives do not have to be bound in 
their minimal domain: i.e. long-distance binding is allowed. Examples 
(9c) and (9d) show that the c-command requirement between ante-
cedents and reflexives is too strong in English. And all the sentences 
above prove that reflexives can be in free variation with pronouns, con-
tradicting the second belief about reflexives indicated in (8b). 
The prediction that discourse binding of reflexives is not allowed is 
easily falsified by the presence of the data as follows: 
(10) a. Hei [ZaPPi] sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. 
In the top right-hand one was an envelope addressed to 
hirnselfi. (Lodge, 62, quoted in Zribi-Hertz, 1989, p.716) 
b. JOhni was furious. 
The picture of hirnselfi in the museum had been mutilated. 
(Pollard and Sag, 1992, p.268) 
c. Shei was not immediately able to say anything, and even 
when her spirits were recovered, shei debated for a short 
5) In this sentence, both the reflexive and the pronoun can be coindexed with Bill, too. 
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time on the answer it would be most proper to give. 
The real state of things between Willoughby and her sister was 
so little known to herselfi, that in endeavouring to explain it, 
she might be as liable to say too much as too little. (Austen SS, 
188, quoted in Baker, 1995, p.67) 
The reflexive option in the second sentence of the discourse in 
(lOa)-(c) indicates that under the right circumstances, discourse-binding 
of reflexives is possible in English. 
The hypothesis that reflexives cannot have split antecedents is also 
untenable, as the well-formedness of examples like (11) shows: 
(11) a. MarYi showed Paulj a nice picture of themselvesi+j. (Zribi-
Hertz, 1989, p.71O) 
b. Johni collaborated with Billj on a biography about themselve-
Si+j. (Okada, 1998, p.61) 
c. Johni shared a startling secret with MarYj about themselvesi+j. 
(Okada, 1998, p.61) 
d. The picture of themselvesi+j reminded Johni of MarYj. (Yi, 
2001, p.373) 
Such examples can be easily multiplied as in (12). A glance at these sen-
tences suffices to prove that the distribution of reflexive pronouns in re-
al life is far from being restricted as binding principles predict. 
(12) a. Maryi whispered secret things to Paulj about themselvesi+j. 
(Zribi-Hertz, 1989, p.7lO) 
b. Both Johni and Billj are famous scholars, and they have done 
a lot of interesting research together in the past. This semes-
ter, Johni asked Billj to come to his university and to lecture 
with him about themselvesi+j in his class. (Okada, 1988, p.68) 
c. Johni told MarYj that washing themselvesi+j would be fun. 
(Hornstein, 1999, p.91) 
The observations so far make it clear that none of the propositions 
about the distribution of English reflexives presented in (8) can be main-
tained when considering examples in real life. The properties of the prob-
lematic reflexives can be summarized as follows: 
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(13) a. Some reflexives don't have to be c-commanded by their 
antecedents. 
b. Some reflexives are in free variation with pronouns. 
c. Some reflexives can be long-distance bound or discourse 
bound. 
d. Some reflexives allow split antecedents. 
How then do we distinguish. those reflexives which are in comple-
mentary distribution with pronouns from the marked ones, exemplified 
in (9)-(12)? There is one simple generalization here: i.e. none of the prob-
lematic reflexives are coarguments of their antecedents. In other words, 
complementarity between reflexives and pronouns can be violated when 
the reflexives and their antecedents are not coarguments (see Pollard and 
Sag, 1992; Reinhart and Reuland, 1993, for the same line of arguments). 
Several solutions have been proposed for the empirical coverage of the 
problematic reflexives. The first line of approach is an attempt to rescue 
the principles A and B by amending them so that all marked cases 
could be accommodated within Chomskyan generative grammar (see 
Stowell, 1983; Hintikka and Kulas, 1985; Chomsky, 1986; Yang, 1989; 
Katada, 1991; Lasnik, 1994). However, technical details aside, these syntac-
tic approaches are not sufficient to specify the domain or the set of po-
tential antecedents for the marked reflexives (Huang, 2000, p.130).6) Nor 
do they have anything to say about the selection of the actual ante-
cedents of those reflexives which involves not only syntactic but also se-
mantic and pragmatic factors.?) 
On the other hand, there have been several attempts to appeal to dis-
course principles (e.g. Zribi-Hertz, 1989; Pollard and Sag, 1992; Vi, 2001) in 
order to take care of the occurrences of marked reflexives (see also 
Kuno, 1987). Common to this line of approaches is that. they draw a 
clear-cut line between syntax and discourse. They claim that there are 
two types of reflexives, namely exempt reflexives and non-exempt 
reflexives. It is the non-exempt reflexives that are subject to syntactic 
constraints such as binding principle A. The exempt reflexives, on the 
contrary, are subject to discourse principles, being exempt from syntactic 
6) For example, the animacy condition which says that antecedents of long-distance reflex-
ives are in general animate cannot be accounted for only in terms of structural conditions. 
7) We will return to this point in the next section. 
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rules. Even though it could be agreed upon that syntactic structure pro-
vides only a part of the information needed to interpret a sentence, this 
line of approach is not without problems. For they could provide only a 
partial account for the binding properties of anaphora by segregating ex-
empt- and non-exempt anaphors as irreconcilably distinct categories. 
Thus we need to consider the possibility of a more general account 
which could show the complete picture of anaphora interpretations in 
English. 
3. Pragmatic Approaches to Anaphora Interpretations 
3.1. A Neo-Gricean Pragmatic Account of Anaphora 
A pragmatic theory of anaphora should consider what the speakers 
and listeners have to do to use and interpret anaphoric expressions such 
as reflexives and pronouns, and it should determine the role of prag-
matic knowledge, as opposed to strictly linguistic knowledge (Blackwell, 
2000, p.389-390). As speakers of a language, we have the ability to dis-
tinguish what is said from what is actually meant. Therefore, if a man 
asks a woman, 'Would you like to go see a movie tonight?,' and if she 
responds by saying 'Well, I have lots of things to do.,' he should be able 
to draw inferences about what is meant by what is said. What we can 
infer from her answer is that she doesn't want to go see a movie with 
him tonight. Information that is conveyed in this way is called 
'conversational implicature' (O'Grady and Archibald, 2000, p.253). 
In the theory of conversational implicature, Grice (1975) suggests that 
in our talk exchange, there is an underlying principle which speakers 
and listeners are expected to be aware of. He named this principle the 
cooperative principle and he further subdivided it into four maxims, 
summarized in (14) and (15). What the cooperative principle and its fol-
lowing maxims ensure is that in an exchange of conversation the speak-
er should provide the right amount of information and that the inter-
action between the speaker and the listener should be conducted in a 
sincere, efficient, relevant, cooperative way. 
(14) Cooperative Principle: Make your conversational contribution 
cooperative. 
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(15) Conversational Maxims: 
a. Quality: Be truthful. 
b. Quantity: (i) Don't say less than is required. 
(ii) Don't say more than is required 
c. Relevance: Be relevant. 
d. Manner: Be brief and orderly. 
Assuming that both the speaker and the listener are observing the 
principle and its component maxims, Grice suggests that the deliberate 
violation of these maxims gives rise to a conversational implicature. 
Thus when what is meant goes well beyond the literal meaning of what 
is uttered, the maxims derive their explanatory power and give an ac-
count of the reason why it happens (see Kearns, 2000, p.254). 
There have been several linguists who have tried to account for ana-
phora use and interpretation in various languages by utilizing Gricean 
principle and maxims (see Reinhart, 1983; Levinson, 1987, 1991; Huang 
1991, 2000; Kim, 1993; Blackwell, 2000). Among them, Levinson (1987) in-
corporates a revised Gricean procedure of implicatures to deal with the 
distribution and interpretation of anaphora. He proposes a set of 
neo-Gricean speaker and listener strategies for anaphora interpretations 
by reducing the original Gricean maxims into three principles, which he 
dubs the Q(uantity}, I(nformativenessh and M(anner) principles. 
The Q-principle tells the speaker to make the informationally strongest 
statement s(he) can, while the listener should assume that the speaker 
has done so (Black well, 2001, p.903). This principle can account for ana-
phora interpretations in environments where a reflexive can be used in 
place of a semantically weaker pronoun. Thus wherever a reflexive (the 
semantically stronger expression) could occur, the use of a pronoun (the 
semantically weaker expression) will Q-implicate disjoint reference 
(Levinson, 1987, 1991). 
The I-principle, on the other hand, says that the form with maximum 
informative value with minimum effort is what one would use if one 
could (Safir, 2004, p.63). Levinson's notion of minimization refers to se-
mantic minimization. Therefore, a preference for coreferential readings is 
in line with this principle (Blackwell, 2000, p.392). Assuming that a pro-
noun is an unmarked instance of the coreferential reading (see Levinson, 
1991, p.8-9), the use of a semantically general pronoun, where a semanti-
cally stronger and more specific reflexive is not available, will induce a 
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stereotypical specific interpretation, namely the coreferential reading. 
The M-principle, which overrides the I-principle, says that a more pro-
lix (marked) form indicates that the less prolix (less marked) form is not 
applicable. What we need to remember here is that unlike the Q-princi-
ple8) the M-principle deals with paired expressions that contrast in sur-
face form rather than semantic informativeness. With regard to ana-
phora interpretations, where a pronoun could be used to express corefer-
ence, use of a more prolix and marked NP would lead the listener to in-
fer that the coreferential reading associated with the unmarked counter-
part was not intended. 
In what follows, we will test the viability of Levinson's neo- Gricean 
pragmatic implicatures for anaphora interpretations in English and in so 
doing deal with the question of whether English native speakers' inter-
pretations of anaphoric elements support patterns of anaphora inter-
pretation predicted by Levinson (1987). 
3.2. Application 
It has been pointed out that anaphora involves syntactic, semantic, 
and pragmatic factors and languages must differ with each other to the 
extent to which syntax, semantics, and pragmatics interact (see Huang, 
1991, 2000). For example, there seems to exist a class of languages 
(so-called pragmatic languages) such as Chinese, Japanese, and Korean in 
which pragmatics is considered to play a central role. On the other 
hand, in some languages such as English and German, rules of grammat-
ical structure instead of pragmatic knowledge are thought to play a ma-
jor role. But even in those syntactic languages when it comes to ana-
phora interpretations, the contribution of pragmatics cannot be denied 
and actually it seems much more fundamental than generative linguists 
have believed. In order to show how the distribution of anaphora in 
syntactic languages like English can be given a better account in terms 
of a neo-Gricean pragmatic theory of conversational implicatures, we 
need to look at the marked occurrences of English reflexives which are 
problematic to purely syntactic approaches. Consider the examples be-
low: 
8) The Q-principle induces a contrastive interpretation from tight contrast sets of equally 
brief, equally lexicalized relations. 
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(16)=(9) 
a. Johni said to Mary that there was a picture of [himselfi 
Ihimi] in the post office. 
b. JOhni heard from Bill that pictures of [himself/himd would be 
on sale. 
c. The picture of [herself/heri] on the front page of the Times 
confirmed the allegations Mary had been making over the 
years. (Pollard and Sag, 1992, p.264) 
d. Those pictures of [himself/himi] taught Johni an important 
lesson. (Yi, 2001, p.372) 
The viability of Levinson's theory relies on the following assumptions. 
First, pronouns will be preferred over reflexives when coreference is in-
tended, unless marked otherwise, due to the I-principle. Second, when 
two different NP-types occur in a given context, they should be in com-
plementary distribution due to the Q- and M-principles. Contrary to the 
predictions of the neo-Gricean framework, however, pronouns and re-
flexives in (16) are in free variation. That is, the use of a pronoun where 
a reflexive could have been used, does not implicate a non-coreferential 
interpretation. 
Here, we should point out the crucial difference between the prag-
matic analysis sketched here and a purely syntactic account. That is, 
while the latter marks each occurrence of a pronoun which is in free 
variation with a reflexive as ungrammatical, the former is not necessa-
rily embarrassed by the failure of such complementary distribution. For 
the Q-/M- inferences to disjoint reference are only defeasible 
implicatures.9) Therefore, if we can show that there are systematic rea-
sons why the given implicatures failed to arise (i.e. they are cancelled) 
in these cases, the marked occurrences of reflexives would no longer be 
a problem. 
The problem, then, is what causes the apparent neutralization of the 
contrast between pronouns and reflexives in some English sentences. 
Common to all the problematic cases mentioned above is that where we 
expect a non-reflexive pronoun, a reflexive being syntactically dis-
9) According to Grice (1975), the distinguishing properties of conversational implicatures are 
(i) defeasibility (cancelability), (ii) non-detachability, (iii) calculability, (iv) non-con-
ventionality, and (v) reinforceability. 
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allowed, we obtain both a reflexive and a pronoun. Considering such 
distributional overlap between reflexives and pronouns cross-linguisti-
cally, Kuno (1972, 1987) argues that even though both a reflexive and a 
pronoun refer to the same individual, the (16a) and (16b) sentences do 
not share the same truth-condition. According to him, wherever reflex-
ives alternate with pronouns in the same context, we can find some 
subtle meaning differences expressed by choosing a reflexive and a pro-
noun: i.e. the use of a reflexive may require that the speaker take its an-
tecedent's point of view, while the non-reflexive pronoun allows the 
normal, deictic, objective point of view (see Kuno and Kaburaki, 1977; 
Levinson, 1991). 
(17) a Johni hid the book behind himselfi. 
b. Johni hid the book behind himi. 
(18) a. Johni pulled the blanket over himselfi. 
b. Johni pulled the blanket over himi. 
For example, according to Kuno (1972, 1987), (17a) may describe a sit-
uation in which John held the book with his hand and put it behind 
his back, so the book was directly touching him (17b), on the other 
hand, implies that there was no physical contact between John and the 
book: i.e. perhaps John lifted the book and put it on a chair, and he was 
standing in front of the chair. Similarly, (18a) implies that John put the 
blanket over his head and covered himself with it, perhaps intending to 
hide under it. On the other hand, (18b) does not imply such direct action 
with the whole body of John as a target of action. 
The association of a subtle meaning difference in point of view with 
the occurrence of reflexives can also handle some more exceptional re-
flexives as in (19):10) 
(19) a. Johni said to Mary that there was a picture of himselfi in the 
post office. 
10) Even generative grammarians admit the fact that anaphora distributions might be corre-
lated with semantic properties such as a point of view. But their crucial assumption is 
that even these semantic properties follow from structural properties instead of the other 
way around (see Zribi-Hertz, 1989, for related discussions). 
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b. Johni said to Mary that there was a picture of himi in the 
post office. 
(20) a. * John said to MarYi that there was a picture of herselfi in the 
post office. 
b. John said to MarYi that there was a picture of heri in the 
post office. 
(19a) may describe a situation in which the sentence is uttered from 
John's point of view. But the use of a pronoun in (19b) and (20b) in-
dicates that the sentence is uttered from the normal, objective point of 
view. (20a) is unacceptable because it is difficult to imagine a situation 
where the sentence is uttered from Mary's point of view, when she is 
not a part of the reported event. The same reasoning can also be applied 
to discourse bound reflexives, as exemplified in (10) in section 2. 
In this way, all the marked cases mentioned above are proved not 
marked any more since although a reflexive and a pronoun appear to 
be in free variation on a superficial level, their semantic/pragmatic envi-
ronments are still distinct: a reflexive is chosen when its antecedent's 
point of view is adopted by the speaker. And a pronoun is used 
otherwise. As a result, the occurrence of a reflexive where it is not syn-
tactically permitted does not implicate disjoint reference. 
Things get more complicated when we note that the account based on 
the alternation of point of view cannot be extended to such examples as 
(21b) and (22b). 
(21) a. John{s fulsomeness embarrassed the Baron as much as 
[himself/himi]. (Zribi-Hertz, 1989, p.718) 
b. John{s friend criticized the Baron as much as [*himselfi.lhimil 
(22) a. Pictures of [himselIi/himiJ don't bother Johni. (Kuno and 
Takami, 1993, p.l55) 
b. Pictures of [*himselIi/himiJ don't portray Johni well. (Kuno 
and Takami, 1993, p.l55) 
Suppose we argue that the use of a reflexive which is not c-commanded 
by its coargument antecedent in (a) sentences is acceptable because the 
sentences are uttered from the antecedent John's point of view. Then 
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we have no reason to rule out (b) sentences' which have exactly the 
same structures. The point is that if we could take John's point of view 
when uttering the sentences (21a) and (22a), we should be able to de-
scribe (21b) and (22b) from John's point of view, too. As a result, the 
neutralization of the opposition between a reflexive and a pronoun 
should be allowed. This is exactly the wrong prediction and our job is to 
explain what causes the difference in the (a) sentences and (b) 
sentences. The answer lies in whether the sentences involve psycho-
logical predicates. 
The psychological predicate phenomenon is cross-linguistically well 
attested. Common to psych-verb constructions is that they have a special 
type of verb called a 'psychological predicate' such as worry and de-
press, and that these sentences all represent the experiencing individual's 
direct internal feeling. And the experiencer, as the one who feels the rel-
evant feeling, is the most optimal element to be coindexed with the re-
flexive in the sentence. Therefore, we can guess that an experiencer 
whose feeling is reflected in the context can be an optimal antecedent of a 
reflexive.ll) Now we are in a position to explain why (21b) and (22b) are 
not acceptable when a reflexive is used: They do not involve psychological 
predicates, so the reflexive in a complement clause fails to be coindexed 
with John. 
Now we can point out semantic/pragmatic factors which cause the 
neutralization of the contrast between reflexives and pronouns in the 
examples (16)-(21): (i) the point of view assumed by a speaker with re-
spect to sentences, and (ii) one whose internal feeling is being reporte 
d,12) Given that these semantic/pragmatic ingredients are what underlie 
the notion of 10gophoricity13) (Sells, 1987), what is suggested by the 
choice of a reflexive in those sentences as opposed to the use of a pro-
noun may be a contrast with the ordinary, non-logophoric interpretation. 
11) Various solutions have been put forward in the generative literature for the account of 
psych-verb constructions (e.g. Pesetsky, 1987; Belletti and Rizzi, 1988). However, it turns 
out that their analyses are not without problems. Interested readers may refer to Kuno 
and Takami (1993), Huang (2000), and Yi (2001), among others. 
12) In other words, the antecedents of such reflexives must be the participants of the dis-
course situation (Okada, 1998, p.77). 
13) The concept of 'Iogophoricity' was introduced in studies of African languages, where there 
are special anaphoric pronouns, called logophoric pronouns, which refer to the individual 
whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are reported or reflected in a given linguistic context 
in which the pronouns occur (elements, 1975, p.l41). 
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At this point, we had better explain how to systematically relate these 
semantic/pragmatic ingredients to the present analysis in terms of 
implicatures. Now we have two options to consider. First, in line with 
Levinson (1991), we can argue that English reflexives encode two meaning 
elements, coreference and logophoricity. Then the use of a pronoun will 
be warranted if the speaker wishes to avoid coreference, logophoricity, 
or both. Given the assumption that logophoric pronouns are semantically 
stronger than reflexives (see Huang, 2000, for a related discussion), what 
we will get by the Q-implicature from the contrast between reflexives 
and pronouns will be coreference, or logophoricity, or both. One immedi-
ate question arises: why in the minimal domain, the contrast in log-
ophoricity never arises? Consider the following: 
(23) Johni loves [himselU*himi]. 
English is not the only language which shows this characteristic. 
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) claim that in languages allowing long-dis-
tance reflexives, a logophoric contrast still does not arise in a minimal 
domain. As a result, pronouns are still excluded in the local coargument 
contexts like (23). 
To capture this fact, we can bring back Principle B of the binding 
theory into our grammar, which surely is an undesirable move. Or as 
Huang (1991) suggests, we can derive the principle B effect from Farmer 
and Harnish's (1987) 'Disjoint Reference Presumption' like (24):14) 
(24) Disjoint Reference Presumption (DRP): The coarguments of a 
predicate tend to be interpreted as disjoint in reference. 
The DRP has the effect of bringing Principle B into our grammar, the 
only difference being that the assumption of disjoint clausemate argu-
ments of the DRP can only be a tendency rather than a grammatical 
14) This line of analysis is advocated in Kim (2003), which stresses the point that the con-
tribution of pragmatics to anaphora interpretations should not be underestimated. Kim 
(2003) assumes that the reflexives of both English and Korean convey two meaning ele-
ments 'coreference' and 'logophoricity.' In the present work, however, it will be suggested 
that contrary to the claim of Kim (2003), English reflexives do not encode 'logophoricity' 
as their basic meaning ingredient. Rather, 'logophoricty' is one of the marked messages 
which we can get as a result of using a more prolix reflexive pronoun where a non-re-
flexive pronoun is expected. 
924 Kim, Sun-Hee 
condition. The DRP is motivated in order to account for the anaphoric 
patterns of languages which lack grammatically specified reflexives alto-
gether (see Huang, 1991). In the case of languages like English, however, 
the effect of both the DRP and Principle B is derived by using the 
Q-principle in coargument contexts, rendering both of them redundant. 
And this is sufficient to read the pronoun as disjoint with a coargument 
antecedent. Then the only motivation for positing the DRP in English is 
to account for the absence of a logophoric contrast in the minimal do-
main as in (23). Therefore, we need to consider a possible account which 
can take care of the given phenomenon without positing the DRP. 
As an alternative, let us suggest that English reflexives do not encode 
two meaning elements, coreference and logophoricty. Rather, we can claim 
that English reflexives have only one meaning element, i.e. coreference, 
and appeal to the systematic interaction between the I- and M-principles 
to account for the Principle B effect. Then what we will get by the 
Q-implicature is always a non-coreferential reading. The neutralization of 
the contrast between reflexives and pronouns, then, can be attributed to 
the M-principle instead, which says a more prolix (marked) form in-
dicates that the less prolix (less marked) form is not applicable. The rea-
soning is that the use of a reflexive (a more prolix and marked form) 
when a pronoun (a less marked form) is expected will give an im-
plication that the unmarked counterpart (i.e. coreference) was not in-
tended: By using the marked reflexive, the speaker wants to convey a 
marked message, which can be logophoricity, or something yet to be 
discovered,15) Note that this line of analysis is surely more preferable 
than the first option because we don't need to stipulate any extra mech-
anism to handle the given phenomenon. 
Now we can give a full account of the basic pattern of English ana-
phora interpretations. 
(25) a. Where the syntax permits a direct encoding of coreferentiality 
(i.e. when a reflexive is c-commanded by a coargument), the 
use of an informationally weaker expression (e.g. a non-re-
15) There has been a longstanding awareness of the fact that reflexives in English could be 
used as a means of contrastive emphasis. This notion of 'contrastive emphasis,' then, 
might be one of the marked messages implicated by the M-principle. Interested readers 
may refer to Zribi-Hertz (1989) and Baker (1995), Kim (2003), among others. 
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flexive pronoun) will Q-implicate a non-coreferential inter-
preta tion,16) 
b. Otherwise, the semantically general, minimally informative 
expression will favor a coreferential interpretation by the 
I-principle. 
c. The use of a marked form (e.g. a reflexive where a pronoun 
might have been used) will M-implicate logophoricity, or 
something yet to be discovered)?) 
3.3. The Interaction between Zeros and Overt NPs 
So far we have deliberately avoided the issue of how zeros and overt 
pronouns interact with each other. In an attempt to show that the prag-
matic theory of anaphora advanced here can be extended to account for 
the interaction of zeros and overt pronouns, we will next turn to the 
distribution of zeros and their interactions with overt NPs in English. 
(26) a. Johni expects 0i to win. 
b. Johni expects himselfi to win. 
(27) a. Johni told MarYi that 0i+j washing themselves would be fun. 
(Hornstein, 1999. p.73) 
b. Johni told MarYi that theiri+j washing themselves would be fun. 
16) By assuming that our syntax permits a direct encoding of coreferentiality between a re-
flexive and its antecedent in a coargument context, we reduce the binding principles to 
Principle A. In other words, all we need in our grammar for the account of anaphora in-
terpretations is Principle A restated in terms of coarguments. 
17) The present analysis can be extended to cover the misbehaving reflexives introduced in 
(9)-(12) as follows: In 'picture noun reflexive' constructions as in (9), reflexives are not syn-
tactically permitted, given that they are not coarguments of the antecedents. Therefore, 
pronouns are subject to the I-principle, resulting in coreference. However, if the un-
marked regular pronoun is not used, but the marked reflexive is used instead, then an 
M-implicature is created; i.e. not only coreference but also logophoricity as well is 
intended. In (10), where discourse binding is allowed, the same reasoning will be applied. 
Given that the antecedent of the reflexive is the individual whose viewpoint or per-
spective is somehow being represented in a given text, the use of the reflexive where the 
regular pronoun is expected will M-implicate 'logophoricty.' The split antecedent reflex-
ives such as (11) and (12) can be taken care of by the same M-based analysis as well. 
Again, the use of the marked reflexive will convey a message that would not have been 
conveyed by the use of the unmarked regular pronoun. And in this case, the marked 
message could be either logophoricity or contrastive emphasis, or both. The limit of space, 
however, disallows us to go into more details. Interested readers may refer to Okada 
(1998), Yi (2001), and Kim (2003) for related discussions. 
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In the case of (26b), a zero anaphora is replaced by a reflexive, while in 
(27b), an overt pronoun is employed instead of a zero form.l8) From the 
point of view of the present analysis, the free variation of zero forms 
and their overt counterparts surely causes some problems: The use of a 
marked form does not M-implicate a disjoint reference. But notice that 
although both zeros and overt NPs (i.e. pronouns or reflexives in this 
case) are interpreted as referring to the same individual, i.e. John in (26) 
and John and Mary in (27), there is a systematic semantic/pragmatic 
contrast between the zeros on the one hand, and overt NPs on the other 
hand. That is, unlike zeros, the overt NPs are used to convey a con-
trastive emphasis. Therefore, sentence (26b) may mean that 'John ex-
pects he himself, rather than anybody else, to win.' Similarly, (27b) can 
be interpreted as 'John told Mary that John and Mary's washing John 
and Mary would be fun, rather than other people's washing John and 
Mary (see Zubin et aI, 1991 for related discussions).' Within the 
neo-Gricean pragmatic framework, the notion of contrastive emphasis as-
sociated with the use of an overt NP falls naturally out of the M-princi-
ple as follows. The use of an overt NP (a reflexive or an overt pronoun 
in these contexts) will M-implicate a contrastive interpretation that 
would not be conveyed by the use of a zero. 
Recall that in the previous section we said using a marked form con-
veys a marked message. The marked message implicated by the M-prin-
ciple was argued to be 'logophoricity,' or 'something yet to be 
discovered.' The discussion related to the interaction of zeros and overt 
NPs further reveals that one of the semantic/pragmatic ingredients, dub-
bed as 'something yet to be discovered,' could be 'contrastive emphasis.' 
Based on the observations so far, we now conclude that the use of a 
marked form in English, when its unmarked counterpart is available in-
dicates some sort of unexpectedness (see Huang, 2000, p.22S). This un-
expectedness could be logophoricity, contrastive emphasis, and so on.l9) 
18) The distribution of zeros such as (26a) and (27a) has attracted many linguists' attentions 
and in Chornskyan generative grammar it is treated as a distinct category PRO. Some 
grammarians like Hornstein (1999), on the other hand, claims that the null category must 
be a pro instead of a PRO. The argument concerning the nature and intrinsic properties 
of the null category, however, is beyond the scope of the present study. 
19) We must make clear the limitation of our present discussion: our aim in this paper is to 
give a reasonable account to anaphora distributions, and not to predict all the possible 
distributions of reflexives in English. 
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4. Conclusion 
The present paper has argued in favor of using a set of revised 
Gricean maxims to explain preferred interpretations of English anaphora. 
Specifically, we have tried to deal with some of the difficulties of purely 
syntactic accounts such as Chomsky's binding theory, and in so doing 
have concluded that the distribution of reflexives, pronouns, and even 
zeros can be largely accounted for by referring to a generalized con-
versational implicature such as the Q-, 1-, and M- principles. 
The interpretation mechanism of English anaphora presented in this 
paper can be summarized as follows. First, we accept a revised version 
of Principle A of the binding theory as a rule of grammar: i.e. reflexives 
must be coindexed with their coargument antecedents.20) The use of a 
pronoun in environments where a reflexive can be applied due to 
Principle A will then Q-implicate a non-coreferential reading. Where the 
syntax does not permit the use of a reflexive, the use of a semantically 
general pronoun will I-implicate a coreferential interpretation. The use of 
a marked form, a reflexive in place of a pronoun, or an overt NP (e.g. 
pronouns and reflexives) in place of a zero will M-implicate unexpected-
ness, which turns out to be logophoricity, contrastive emphasis, or some-
thing yet to be discovered. 
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